The Rake. Under My Master's Wings. Lauren Wissot. Philippa Masters.
Prudence- Her Desire 2. No evidence of crew or passengers on exterior. Interior scans inconclusive. I would love for Jynn to end up with both Antone and Roman. Most churches are going under. Once you accept that human desire is good, then anything goes.
Lingering Lessons. Sarah Veitch. Deep Blue. Cassandra's Conflict. Fredrica Alleyn. Strip Girl. Haven of Obedience. Marina Anderson. The Discipline. Agatha Raisin and the Curious Curate. The Greek Tycoon's Love-Child.
Jacqueline Baird. Girl for Hire. The Dining Club. A Study in Shame. Tom King. Bare Behind. Slippery When Wet. Bad Penny. Tracey Cox. In For A Penny. In Disgrace. The Pony Girl Collection. Thai Honey. Kit McCann. When She Was Bad. Slave-Mines of Tormunil.
The Den Her Deepest Darkest Depraved Desire and Dark Beginnings The Darkest Fire The Darkest Prison The Darkest Angel, The Monsters Breeding. [EPUB] The Den (Her Deepest, Darkest, Depraved Desire) by Cherry Wild. Book file PDF easily for everyone and every device. You can download and read.
Aran Ashe. Dirty Laundry. Nexus Confessions: Volume One. New Erotica 6. Ebury Publishing. Penny in Harness. Nexus Confessions: Volume Two. A Taste of Amber. Love Song of the Dominatrix. Cat Scarlett. Uniform Dolls. Penny Pieces. True Confessions of Group Sex. Tony Damosto.
Ann Summers. Nexus Confessions: Volume Six. Company Of Slaves. Christina Shelly. But, that being so, the Concept remains one-sided and it is afflicted with the defect that, although itself implicitly totality, it allows only to the side of unity and universality the right of free development. It negates itself as this ideal unity and universality and now releases to real independent objectivity what this unity shut in within itself as ideal subjectivity. By its own activity the Concept posits itself as objectivity.
But, since it is only the Concept which has to give itself existence and reality in objectivity, objectivity will have to bring the Concept to actuality in objectivity itself. Yet the Concept is the mediated ideal unity of its particular factors. Therefore, although the difference of the particulars is real, their ideal conceptually adequate unity must all the same be restored within them; they are particularized in reality but their unity, mediated into ideality, must also exist in them.
This is the power of the Concept which does not abandon or lose its universality in the dispersed objective world, but reveals this its unity precisely through and in reality. For it is its own Concept to preserve in its opposite this unity with itself. Only so is the Concept the actual and true totality. On both sides, subjective and objective, of the Concept, the Idea is a whole, but at the same time it is the eternally completing and completed correspondence and mediated unity of these totalities. Only so is the Idea truth and all truth.
Everything existent, therefore, has truth only in so far as it is an existence of the Idea. For the Idea is alone the genuinely actual. Appearance, in other words, is not true simply because it has an inner or outer existence, or because it is reality as such, but only because this reality corresponds with the Concept. Only in that event has existence actuality and truth.
And truth not at all in the subjective sense that there is an accordance between some existent and my ideas, but in the objective meaning that the ego or an external object, an action, an event, a situation in its reality is itself a realization of the Concept.
If this identity is not established, then the existent is only an appearance in which, not the total Concept, but only one abstract side of it is objectified; and that side, if it establishes itself in itself independently against the totality and unity, may fade away into opposition to the true Concept.
Thus it is only the reality which is adequate to the Concept which is a true reality, true indeed because in it the Idea itself brings itself into existence. Now we said that beauty is Idea, so beauty and truth are in one way the same. Beauty, namely, must be true in itself.
But, looked at more closely, the true is nevertheless distinct from the beautiful. That is to say, what is true is the Idea, the Idea as it is in accordance with its inherent character and universal principle, and as it is grasped as such in thought. But the Idea should realize itself externally and win a specific and present existence as the objectivity of nature and spirit. The true as such exists also.
http://banglore.netspaceindia.com/126.php Now when truth in this its external existence is present to consciousness immediately, and when the Concept remains immediately in unity with its external appearance, the Idea is not only true but beautiful. Therefore the beautiful is characterized as the pure appearance of he Idea to sense. For the sensuous and the objective as such reserve in beauty no independence in themselves; they have to sacrifice the immediacy of their being, since this being is only the existence and objectivity of the Concept; and it is posited as a reality which presents the Concept as in unity with its objectivity and thus also presents the Idea itself in this objective existent which has worth only as a pure appearance of the Concept.
Thus the Understanding steadily remains in the field of the finite, the one-sided, and the untrue. The beautiful, on the other hand, is in itself infinite and free. For even if there can be a question too of a particular content, and therefore, once more, of a restricted one, still this content must appear in its existence as a totality infinite in itself and as freedom, because the beautiful throughout is the Concept. And the Concept does not set itself against its objectivity by opposing to it a one-sided finitude and abstraction; on the contrary, it closes together with what confronts it and on the strength of this unity and perfection is infinite in itself.
In the same way, the Concept ensouls the real existence which embodies it, and therefore is free and at home with itself in this objectivity. For the Concept does not allow external existence in the sphere of beauty to follow its own laws independently; on the contrary, it settles out of itself its phenomenal articulation and shape, and this, as the correspondence of the Concept with itself in its outward existence, is precisely what constitutes the essence of beauty. But the bond and the power which keeps this correspondence in being is subjectivity, unity, soul, individuality.
As finite intelligences, we sense inner and outer objects, we observe them, we become aware of them through our senses, we have them brought before our contemplation and ideas, and, indeed, before the abstractions of our thinking understanding which confers on them the abstract form of universality. The finitude and unfreedom of this attitude lies in presupposing things to be independent.
Therefore we direct our attention to things, we let them alone, we make our ideas, etc. With this one-sided freedom of objects there is immediately posited the unfreedom of subjective comprehension. For in the case of this latter the content is given, and instead of subjective self-determination there enters the mere acceptance and adoption of what is there, objectively present just as it is.
Truth in that case is to be gained only by the subjugation of subjectivity.
The same thing is true, though in an opposite way, with finite willing. Here interests, aims, and intentions lie in the subject who wills to assert them in face of the being and properties of things. For he can only carry out his decisions by annihilating objects, or at least altering them, moulding them, forming them, cancelling their qualities, or making them work upon one another, e. Thus now it is things which are deprived of their independence, since the subject brings them into his service and treats and handles them as useful, i.
Subject and object have exchanged their roles. The objects have become unfree, the subjects free.
But, as a matter of fact, in both these relations, both sides are finite and one-sided, and their freedom is a purely supposititious freedom.